



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION/PRIVACY OFFICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-5995

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

NOV 25 2008

Freedom of Information/
Privacy Office

This responds to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of October 26, 2006, to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for records concerning Jackson Northman "Jack" Anderson. On September 29, 2008, the FBI forwarded your request to the Department of the Army, Freedom of Information and Privacy Act Division (DA, FOIA/PA Div), along with Army-originated records retrieved from their files for a releasability determination. This correspondence was received in this office on October 30, 2008.

We have completed a mandatory declassification review in accordance with Executive Order (EO) 12958, as amended. As a result of our review, it has been determined that the information contained in the records no longer warrants security classification protection and is releasable to you. The records are enclosed for your use.

We are forwarding a copy of this letter to the (DA FOIA/PA Div FOIA 09-0034) and FBI (FOI/PA #1064442-000).

There are no assessable FOIA fees for processing this request.

If you have any questions about this action, please contact this office at (301) 677-4742 and refer to case #76F-09.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Susan J. Butterfield", is positioned above the printed name.

Susan J. Butterfield
Director
Freedom of Information/Privacy Office
Investigative Records Repository

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY MISSILE COMMAND
REDSTONE ARSENAL, ALABAMA 35899

AX 65-253

3.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DRSMT-RC

1 NOV 1976

Lieutenant General H. H. Cooksey
Deputy Chief of Staff for Research,
Development and Acquisition
Department of the Army
Washington, DC 20330

ALL THE INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 07-31-2007 BY 60324aucdew/cv/rds

Dear General Cooksey:

During your visit to Missile Command last week, you and I discussed the concern that we feel here at Missile Command concerning the detailed countermeasures information that is being published in recent GAO reports. The information is, in our view, quite sensitive in nature. Similar information on Soviet systems would certainly be very useful to us. You asked me to provide you with some specific examples.

You probably saw the recent public release of quotes from GAO reports in the two newspaper articles at Inclosures 1 and 2. This release, though probably damaging, is not the real issue. Our real concern is the appearance of detailed countermeasures vulnerability information in external audit reports. The presence of this information in conjunction with the wide distribution of these reports increases the possibility of compromise.

Extracts from several GAO reports are attached. This representative sampling is provided to illustrate the type of information and the depth of detail contained within external audit reports. We have recommended to the Materiel Development and Readiness Command that they propose the segregation of the type of information in an annex to the main body of the report. This would permit increased management of access to this sensitive data.

Sincerely yours,

Grayson D. Tate, Jr.

GRAYSON D. TATE, JR.
Brigadier General, USA
Deputy Commander

3 Incl
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NOV 18 2008

by USAINSCOM FOI/PA

Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

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REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED
FROM CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES

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4.

~~SECRET~~
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF
FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ACQUISITION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

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REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

DAMA-PPM-M

9 DEC 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Classified Information in GAO Publications

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1. Inclosed is a letter from BG Tate, Deputy Commander of MIGOM. The letter expresses his concern about the security of classified information, specifically detailed countermeasure information in GAO reports and staff studies.
2. BG Tate cites the publication of classified information from classified GAO documents (GAO Staff Study (OSD #4250-10), Roland and Chaparral Missile and Antiaircraft Gun Programs, 17 March 1976, Confidential) in Jack Anderson's nationally syndicated "Merry-go-round" column. Though the unauthorized disclosure of classified information in Jack Anderson's column is of grave concern to the Army, there is an overriding fear of the disclosure of far more sensitive information in similarly classified GAO documents. BG Tate's letter includes excerpts from other GAO reports and staff studies which could be quite damaging to U.S. military effectiveness if they get into the wrong hands.
3. I would appreciate your assistance in determining if there is anything we can do to correct this situation. As it stands we provide extremely valuable information to the Soviets, especially in the sensitive air defense area. ..

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-31-2007 BY 60324aucbaw/rs/rds

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as

Lawson

HOWARD H. COOKSEY
Lieutenant General, GS
Deputy Chief of Staff for Research,
Development, and Acquisition

CF: Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on
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NOV 18 2008

by USAINSCOM FOI/PA


Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R.



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REGRAD UNCLASSIFIED
WHEN CLASIFIED FROM
CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS



AX 65-253
5.

ARMY MISSILES FAIL TO MEET
REQUIRED PERFORMANCE MARKS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

By Jack Anderson
with Les Whitten

WASHINGTON-The Pentagon has the disturbing habit of sweeping its mistakes under the secrecy label.

Government accountants have found, for example, that the Army's short-range defense system is "troubled by uncertainty and high cost." But the accountants have authority to overrule the

MERRY-GO-ROUND

military brass on secrecy. So the misspending has been concealed from the public.

We have obtained a copy, however, of the General Accounting Office's classified study of the short-range air defense system, which the Army called SHORAD for short. Clearly the taxpayers are entitled to know how their money has been wasted. As for military security, intelligence experts concede that the Soviets know all about the SHORAD system because of its widespread use in Europe.

The GAO report uses such words as "inadequacies" and "deficiencies" to describe the system. To call it a "troubled" system would be a mild assessment.

The story necessarily is technical. The GAO study covered three basic components of the SHORAD system: Chaparral missiles, Roland missiles and anti-aircraft artillery.

The Chaparral missiles form the backbone of the SHORAD system. These missiles, mounted on tracked vehicles, were rushed to Europe at the end of the 1960s to fill an "urgent" defense gap. They were supposed to be integrated with existing military weapons such as the Navy's Sidewinder missiles.

The arriving Chaparral missiles, according to the government accountants, had some "performance weaknesses" such as "an inability to engage incoming aircraft, inadequate warhead, etc."

This was a polite way of saying they didn't work, since their function was to engage incoming aircraft.

The Army recognized the deficiencies and intended to correct them. Or, to put it in the bureaucratic language of the Army brass, they "planned an expedited product improvement program."

But the accountants reported despairingly: "Although the Army has since come up with a number of improvements, they have not yet been made to the system. Thus the system in use today is still essentially the same as originally fielded."

Here are a few of the "performance weaknesses" that the GAO cited:

-The Chaparral is a sunshine weapon. Its "unrestricted use... is possibly only in fair-weather conditions." Unfortunately, this occurs only about 25 percent of the time. Thus an enemy need merely strike during bad weather. (Confidential)

-Unhappily, Chaparral missiles are also susceptible to enemy countermeasures. In fact, enemy planes could "essentially" have complete protection from Chaparral attack, the report warns. (Confidential)

-Chaparral missiles also have limited tactical use. Worse, the "survivability" of their launch unit in combat is a major problem.

-The Chaparral system relies on the gunner's ability visually to detect and distinguish between friendly and enemy aircraft. This is difficult to do with planes flying faster than sound. Thus in gloomy weather, the missile operators might shoot down the wrong planes.

Footnote: Despite all its problems, the Army wants to buy more Chaparrals, a move that the GAO labels "questionable." The Army is also developing the Roland as part of the answer to the Chaparral's inadequacies. But now "serious problems" have developed in the Roland program.

All Army information contained herein was regraded
UNCLASSIFIED on
By USAINSCOM FOIPA
Auth Para 4-102, DOD 5200.1R

TAKEN FROM HUNTSVILLE, AL. HUNTSVILLE TIMES, 6 Oct 76

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-31-2007 BY 60324mhas/vav/rs

NOV 18 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR RESEARCH AND
ACQUISITION.

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SUBJECT: Classified Information in GAO Publications

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ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-31-2007 BY 60324aucbaw/rs/rds

1. Brigadier General Tate's letter points out an area of continuing concern for the intelligence community. There was in fact one item in the 6 October 1976 article that is still classified. The 5 October 1976 expose of the Maverick system contained no classified material.
2. The FBI has in the past attempted to locate the source or sources of classified information leakage within the civilian community. They have not been overly affective however in regards to Mr. Anderson's sources. We of course actively seek out DA violators
3. Individual GAO reports are reviewed by the Security Division of OACSI to insure that the material is correctly classified. Each item that is classified is marked with brackets and appropriately classified e.g. C-Confidential, S-Secret etc.
4. Classified GAO reports are distributed to the Congress and to other agencies having a legitimate "need to know." They are issued as classified documents to be protected to a degree commensurate with their classification. B.G. Tate's suggested special classified annex would be issued to the same agencies. Control of the annex would be as difficult to monitor as is the present system.

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NOV 18 2008

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